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Problems and Policy Options
María Ramos and Carlos Victoria  
Summary Youth unemployment rates in Spain are considerably higher than the 
European average. Moreover, those young people who do have jobs generally 
work under extremely unstable conditions on temporary contracts. Most of these 
temporary contracts are “involuntary” – workers would prefer to find permanent 
jobs but are unable to do so. The consequences of this job insecurity in Spain are 
dramatic. Across the educational spectrum, young workers are at greater risk of 
remaining unemployed, getting stuck in temporary contracts for long periods of 
time, experiencing wage penalties, or being over-qualified for their jobs. The crisis 
has increased the overall risk of long-term poverty and social exclusion, particularly 
for youth with migrant backgrounds and those who are not in education, employ-
ment, or training. The paper concludes by outlining the three most urgent objec-
tives for the Spanish labor market today: bridging the gap between education and 
work; developing active labor market policies; and reducing labor market segmen-
tation between workers with temporary and permanent contracts and between 
“insiders” and “outsiders.”
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Unemployment is arguably the main challenge the Span-
ish economy faces today. While low employment is a mat-
ter of concern for many countries, Spain’s disproportion-
ate unemployment figures surprise beyond its national 
borders.1 In mid 2016, as other countries start showing 
signs of recovery from the “Great Recession,” there are 
still 4.5 million unemployed in Spain – an unemployment 
rate of about 20 percent. More than 1 million of these are 
young people under the age of thirty. 
It is well known that unemployment rates in Spain, 
and especially among youth, are considerably higher 
than the European average. Moreover, young people who 
do have jobs generally work under very unstable condi-
tions; most have temporary contracts because they are 
not able to find permanent jobs. The consequences of this 
job insecurity – a combination of high unemployment 
rates, temporary employment, and uncertainty about 
the professional futures of young people – are dramatic. 
Across the educational spectrum, young workers in Spain 
have greater chances of remaining unemployed or getting 
stuck in a temporary contract for long periods of time, 
experiencing wage penalties, or being over-qualified for 
their jobs. The crisis has, moreover, increased this group’s 
risk of experiencing poverty and social exclusion. This 
is particularly the case for the so-called NEETs (young 
people who are “not in education, employment, or train-
ing”) and those with migrant backgrounds.
Youth in Germany, France, and Spain:  
Three Very Different Experiences
In analyzing the Spanish case, we have kept France 
and Germany in mind for comparative purposes. While 
recognizing that every country has its own character-
istics and follows its own path – and while remaining 
cautious about drawing generalizations from individual 
instances of success – the examples of other countries 
offer lessons worth considering.
A recent study of youth unemployment problems in 
Europe edited by Juan J. Dolado identified three groups 
of countries that correspond to the cases considered 
here: Germany as an example a “top performer” (to-
gether with Austria and Switzerland); France as one of 
the “middle performers” (together with Sweden and the 
United Kingdom); and Spain, as one of the “laggards” 
hit hardest by the crisis (alongside Greece, Italy, and 
Portugal).2
The table on page 4 provides some indicators that 
allow us to compare the main characteristics of the 
German, French, and Spanish labor markets. Spain 
stands out in the high level of both its general and youth 
unemployment levels. Even at the peak of its real estate 
bubble, moreover, Spain had abnormally high levels 
of unemployment. Regarding the conditions of those 
employed, both France and Spain have a high share of 
temporary contracts; however, temporary work in Spain 
has some distinguishing features, and the proportion 
of contracts that are “involuntary” – that is, the main 
reason for them is that their holders are unable to secure 
permanent contracts – is much higher in Spain. More-
over, the temporary-to-permanent conversion rate is 
also very low. The situation is similar regarding part-
time jobs. Employment protection legislation is extreme-
ly dual in both France and Spain.3 Whereas in Germany, 
the link between the educational system and the job 
market is fluid, in Spain and France it is less functional.
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The analysis looks at the present and future effects of job 
insecurity among Spanish youth and outlines some policy 
measures for tackling it. Section 1 reviews the main fig-
ures and facts about unemployment in Spain, focusing on 
the disproportionate impact of the recession on the young 
compared to the general population. Section II examines 
recent trends in long-term unemployment and outlines 
the long-term effects on the careers of workers. It also 
reviews the data on temporary employment and outlines 
the main characteristics of the Spanish labor market, 
highlighting the phenomena of duality of temporary and 
permanent contracts and segmentation between tempo-
rary and indefinite workers. Finally, the section com-
ments on the negative impact of temporary employment 
on youth. Section III sketches policy options for tackling 
the labor problems of Spanish youth, focusing on three 
priorities: 1) closing the gap between education and work, 
2) designing active labor market policies, and 3) reducing 
segmentation in the the labor market.
I. Trends in Unemployment Rates
While the Great Recession involved a considerable decline 
in GDP all over Europe, the adverse economic situation on 
employment has varied widely from country to country. 
Looking first at changes in total unemployment rates  
(fig. 1, left panel), we see that unemployment in Spain has 
risen dramatically since 2008: from around 11 percent 
in 2008 to a peak of 26.1 percent in 2013 and remaining 
above 22 percent in 2015. The increase in French unem-
ployment has been timid in comparison: 3 percentage 
points since 2008, up to 10.4 percent in 2015. The situation 
Table 1. Some Descriptive Indicators of the Countries Considered
Germany France Spain
Youth Unemployment Low (ca. 8%) Medium (20–25%) High (up to 50% during the 
recession)
General Unemployment Low (5–7%) Medium (9–10%) High (up to 25% during the 
recession)
Temporary Contracts High number of temporary con-
tracts, most of them for training
High number of temporary con-
tracts, most of them involuntary or 
for training
High number of temporary con-
tracts, most of them involuntary 
and with very low temporary-to-
permanent conversion rates
Part-time Jobs Abundance of voluntary part-time 
jobs
Abundance of involuntary part-
time jobs
Abundance of involuntary part-
time jobs
Link between the Educational 
System and Work
Efficient use of vocational training 
and apprenticeship institutions
Bridges from vocational training to 
formal degrees
Partly dysfunctional
Weak links between education 
and work
Vocational training unappreciated 
by general population
Excess of supply of university 
degrees
 
Figure 1. Unemployment Rates since 1983
a) Unemployment rate b) Youth (15–24) unemployment rate
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat)
Source: The authors, based on OECD and Eurostat indicators
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in Germany is markedly different: although the rate in-
creased minimally from 2008 to 2009 (by 0.2 percentage 
points), it has steadily decreased since then, reaching 4.6 
percent in 2015.
Something similar happened with youth unemploy-
ment rates in these three countries (fig. 1, right panel). 
With the second highest youth unemployment rate in the 
EU (after Greece), Spain has seen its figures worsen dra-
matically since 2007. For young people aged 15 to 24, the 
rate rose by 40 percentage points between the beginning 
of the Great Recession and 2015. (In contrast, Germany’s 
rate decreased by 3 percentage points in the same period.) 
In 2013 rates in Spain peaked at 55.5 percent of all youth 
– a sharp contrast to Germany’s highest youth unemploy-
ment levels: 15.5 percent in 2005.
Although unemployment in Spain has increased 
greatly in recent years, the problem is not new. Even in 
comparatively good times, such as the mid 1980s and 
mid 1990s, unemployment rates have been extremely 
high.4 We see that the country’s economy combines two 
distinctive features: not only is Spain’s unemployment 
rate abnormally high during times of economic expansion 
(the average rate from 1995 to 2015 was above 16 percent, 
whereas in France it was slightly above 9 percent and in 
Germany below 8 percent), it also shoots up during reces-
sionary periods.
Youth and Adult Unemployment: The Uneven  
Impact of the Recession
In all countries, the youth unemployment rate is higher 
than the general unemployment rate, as youths tend to be 
more vulnerable to unemployment than adults. Several 
explanations have been offered for this (summarized on 
Table 2).
Table 2. Some Explanations for Higher Rates of  
Youth Unemployment
Demand-side factors Supply-side factors
Youths have less specific human 
capital and fewer work skills, and 
firms usually have greater ability 
to fire them or not renew their 
contracts (“last-in first-out” rule).
The “experience trap”: employers 
prefer workers with experi-
ence, so youths are rarely hired 
and therefore cannot acquire 
experience.
Youth are less efficient in job 
search activities.
Youths tend to have fewer 
financial commitments than their 
elders.
Their parents may be willing 
to support them if they are 
unemployed.
Despite the fact that unemployment always affects 
more young people, however, there are significant 
national differences in the youth-adult unemployment 
ratio.5 These ratios are particularly large in Denmark, Fin-
land, Italy, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Iceland, Swe-
den, and the UK – countries with very high rates of youth 
unemployment. Germany and Austria have the smallest 
ratios (of approximately 1:5), meaning that the differences 
between youth and adult unemployment are not so large. 
In Spain this ratio is approximately 2:1, meaning that 
the unemployment rate for youth (aged 15–24) is about 
twice the adult unemployment rate. (This mirrors the EU 
average rate.) This suggests that, compared with other 
countries and bearing in mind the large overall rates of 
unemployment, Spain has to tackle the specific problem 
of the labor situation of its youth in addition to the gen-
eral labor market problem for its general population.
It has been widely shown that youth unemployment 
has a high degree of cyclical sensitivity – that is,  that 
youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to business-
cycle conditions than adult unemployment rates. This is 
due to the disproportionate presence of young people in 
temporary jobs as well as to their concentration in more 
seasonal and cyclically-sensitive industries such as retail 
trade or accommodation and food service activities.6 
Moreover, as a group, young people have been among 
those most affected by the recent recession and the un-
even recovery.7
While youth unemployment rates around the world are 
indeed higher than the unemployment rate of the general 
population (and in recent years have increased more than 
the rate of unemployment for older workers), there are 
notable national differences. Mediterranean countries, for 
example, have significantly higher rates of youth unem-
ployment than their Northern European counterparts and 
other parts of the developed world. Spain in particular is 
the country with the highest rate, while France has regis-
tered only a slight increase, and Germany has been able 
avoid the worst effects of the financial crisis.
The Lasting Effects of Long-term Unemployment
Unemployment in Spain is not only problematic for its 
intensity but also for its persistence. The problem is not 
only the high percentage of unemployed but also the fact 
that, in many cases, unemployment endures over workers’ 
lifetimes.
The long-term unemployment rate has grown steadily 
in Spain since the beginning of the recent recession (fig.2), 
and has only started to decrease in the last year. Before 
the crisis, it stood at comparatively low levels, and it was 
Source: The authors, based on data presented in David Bell and David Blanchflower, “Young 
People and the Great Recession,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 27, no. 2 (2011), 
pp. 241–67
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even below the levels registered in Germany or France. As 
the economic situation worsened, however, the percent-
age of long-term and very-long unemployed within the 
active population kept growing. It peaked between 2013 
and 2014, where 13 percent and 8.2 percent of the active 
population remained unemployed for more than 12 and 24 
months, respectively.
Long-term unemployment is not as common among 
Spain’s youth than among its older workers. Less than 
30 percent of workers aged 16–19 and around 40 per-
cent of workers aged 20–24 have experienced long-term 
unemployment (fig. 3), whereas the vast majority of 
older unemployed people have been without jobs for 
more than 12 months. There is a high degree of vari-
ability among young workers, however; while some 
can find a job quite quickly, others get stuck on the 
unemployment rolls. German youth unemployment, in 
contrast, is characterized by relatively short average 
duration.8
Studies show that long-term unemployment can 
have long-lasting negative effects on the careers of 
workers. Adverse social impacts of unemployment on 
youth include “state dependence”(i.e., bad labor market 
outcomes are a consequence of extended unemploy-
ment) and “scarring effects” (initial failures on the la-
bor market often entail long-lasting negative outcomes 
on future employment perspectives, earnings, etc.). 
David Bell and David Blanchflower found evidence of 
state dependence in youth unemployment, meaning 
that the experience of one period of unemployment in-
creases the probability of further periods.9 This may be 
because employers are less willing to hire those with a 
record of unemployment or because the experience of 
unemployment discourages individuals from further 
job search activity.
Scarring effects can result, associated with a decline 
in human capital (i.e., deterioration of skills and fore-
gone work experience) or signaling effects (i.e., periods 
of unemployment send a signal of low productivity to 
potential employers). Recent research by Katharine 
G. Abraham and colleagues counters the hypothesis 
that the long-term unemployed have poorer prospects 
from the beginning of their unemployment periods, and 
suggest that the lower level of earnings is attributable 
to difficulties in having future jobs, not by having lower 
earnings when they have a job.10
In addition to negative effects on future wages and em-
ployability, long spells of unemployment in youth can cre-
ate permanent scars and harmful effects, taking a toll on 
such factors as happiness, job satisfaction, and health.11
Figure 2. Long and Very Long-term Unemployment
a) Long-term unemployment  (12 months or more) as a 
percentage of active population
b) Very long-term unemployment (24 months or more) as a 
percentage of active population
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat)
Figure 3. Length of Unemployment by Age Group
Time in unemployment, by age group
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat)
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II. Temporary Employment and the Structure 
of the Labor Market
Spain’s high level of youth unemployment is not the only 
negative indicator for young people on the Spanish labor 
market. The comparatively large proportion of tempo-
rary employment is also alarming, especially because 
most temporary contracts are involuntary – meaning 
that workers accept them only because they cannot find a 
permanent job.
Spain stands out from France and Germany for its 
higher share of temporary contracts (fig. 4). Indeed, 
within Europe, Spain is surpassed only by Poland in its 
extremely high proportion of young people working on 
temporary contracts. The use of temporary contracts – 
in particular for young workers – became widespread 
in the 1980s after the implementation in 1984 of a labor 
market reform that eliminated the requirement that 
temporary contracts be associated with activities of a 
temporary nature. Temporary contracts peaked in 1995, 
when 76.5 percent of workers aged 18–24 had them. 
This was followed by a few years of stability and a 
relative decline in the levels of temporary work among 
young people. However, the amount of temporary work 
started rising continuously in the first years of the 
recession (2007–10). This has been a specific feature of 
the Spanish labor market during the crisis, when more 
jobs were cut in the temporary sector.
The problem of temporary contracts in the Spanish 
labor market relates not only to its intensity but also to 
its involuntary nature. As we have seen, around 70 per-
cent of workers aged 15–24 have a temporary contract 
in Spain (fig. 4) – higher than in France or Germany, 
where the percentage is about 60 and 55 percent, re-
spectively. It is essential to note here that most tempo-
rary contracts in Spain, moreover, are involuntary; four 
out of five young Spaniards have temporary contracts 
because they are unable to find permanent jobs (fig. 5). 
We can therefore conclude that in Spain, temporary 
work is involuntary in general. This situation contrasts 
with a country like Germany, where less than 5 percent 
of young people working on a temporary contract can-
not find a permanent one, and where the main reason 
for having a temporary contract is that they are either 
in education or training or are employed for a proba-
tionary period.
Figure 4. Percentage of Temporary Contracts among
a) Youth (18–24) workers b) Total population
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (OECD Labour Market Statistics)
Figure 5. Levels of Temporary Employment for Youth 
(18–24) Workers: Involuntary, Voluntary, and Training
Bars represent the total share of temporary employees as a percentage of the total number of 
employees 
Involuntary temporary employment refers to those individuals who answer that they “could not 
find permanent job,” while voluntary temporary employment includes those who answer that 
they “did not want a permanent job.” Training refers to those who are in education or training, 
or employed for a probationary period.
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, 2015)
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Three Distinctive Features of Temporary Employ-
ment in Spain
To sum up, the Spanish labor market has three distinc-
tive features of temporary employment. 1) Most youth 
employment – about 70 percent – is temporary. Tem-
porary contracts are the hiring norm in Spain, and the 
default type of contract offered to young workers. 2) Most 
temporary contracts for young people – 80 percent – are 
involuntary. Training contracts and apprenticeships are 
much less widespread than they are in Germany, and only 
a small proportion of young workers have a temporary 
contract by choice rather than out of necessity. 3) Many 
temporary short-term contracts are linked together, a 
feature closely related to points 1 and 2. This chain of tem-
porary contracts, rather than serving as than a stepping-
stone to more stable contracts, usually becomes a trap 
for young workers. While it is true that young people 
in many countries enter the labor market on temporary 
contracts, the difference in Spain is that they tend to stay 
on temporary contracts for a very long period of time, 
making temporary employment in Spain a highly persis-
tent phenomenon. A 2007 study showed that 21.4 percent 
of temporary workers still had a temporary contract after 
five years; while a 2011 study found that over 40 percent 
of those who entered the labor market before age 21 with 
a temporary contract remained in that situation after 
twenty years.12 In addition, the rate of converting tempo-
rary contracts to permanent ones is very low – generally 
below 10 percent.13
Negative Consequences of Temporary Employ-
ment in Youth
Spanish policy makers should be concerned that tempo-
rary contracts are a standard path for the labor incorpo-
ration of young people. Job insecurity associated with 
temporary contracts may affect workers in many different 
ways, from future wages and healthy career develop-
ment to long-term chances of being unemployed and the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion. An employee’s type 
of contract, for instance, has an effect on transitions to 
unemployment; temporary workers become unemployed 
at a higher rate than ones with permanent contracts.14 In 
Spain this difference is striking. More than 20 percent of 
temporary workers moved to unemployment in 2014.
Furthermore, the short duration of temporary con-
tracts and the instability linked to them gives firms very 
little incentive to invest in training. Wages are signifi-
cantly lower for temporary jobholders. Evidence shows 
that workers entering the labor market right after the 
liberalization of temporary contracts – i.e., after 1984 – 
experienced a penalty in the form of accumulated days of 
work and accumulated earnings, and can persist beyond 
five to ten years of working career.15
Finally, the problem of “in-work-poverty” and the risk 
of social exclusion is particularly important for the young-
est workers with temporary contracts. Regarding the 
risk of poverty and social exclusion of young people, the 
European Commission points to a direct relation between 
three factors: leaving the parental household, level of 
education (in an inverse relation), and whether or not the 
person is an immigrant or has an immigration back-
ground. Two groups at a higher risk of social exclusion are 
therefore “NEETs” (youth “not in employment, education 
or training”) and those with migrant backgrounds.16
III. Policy Options 
The Spanish labor market is so dysfunctional – particularly 
for young people – that it is tempting to emulate wholesale 
the successful experiences of other countries. Naturally, 
the German case has received much attention. Despite the 
decline in Germany’s GDP, the recession did not adversely 
impact its labor market, and unemployment rates were 
hardly affected. Indeed, unemployment rates – both for the 
general population and for youth – have been going down 
in recent years. A word of caution is needed, however. 
Although some of the policies driving Germany’s success 
could guide policy measures elsewhere, others are not so 
easily extrapolated to different national contexts.17 
Youth unemployment can be a problem even during 
times of economic growth, and many different national 
policies have been carried to address it. Success appears 
linked to implementing better vocational training and 
apprenticeship institutions, such as the “dual system” 
(on-the-job training plus formal vocational education) 
common in Germany and programs that target potential 
school dropouts and keep “bridges” open to higher educa-
tion. Strikingly different policies are in place in different 
countries, with correspondingly different rates of success. 
Whereas youth unemployment in Germany has decreased 
since 2008, France and especially Spain have seen further 
deterioration. Two reasons suggested for Spain’s lower 
performance – apart from the impact of the recession itself 
– are segmentation of the labor market and poor vocational 
training.
Three objectives are particularly urgent for the Spanish 
labor market today: 1) bridging the gap between education 
and work, 2) developing active labor market policies that 
really work, and 3) reducing labor market segmentation 
between “insiders” and “outsiders.”
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Bridge the Gap between Education and Work 
One of Spain’s most persistent structural problems is the 
lack of connection between the educational system and 
the labor market. Levels of dropouts in secondary and 
post-secondary school are worrying. The percentage of 
young employees who consider themselves over-qualified 
is also much higher in Spain than in the rest of Europe, 
and far above Germany; this is true for all educational 
levels, but especially for those with tertiary education 
(two out of three). Moreover, many employers are reluc-
tant to hire young people with no work experience.
The Spanish government has already implemented 
several measures to tackle these problems. These include 
the Estrategia de Emprendimiento y Empleo Joven (strat-
egy for enterprise and youth employment) of 2013, which 
focuses on helping young people enter the workforce, and 
the Plan Nacional de Implantación de la Garantía Juve-
nil (the National Plan for Implementing the [European] 
Youth Guarantee), which aims to guarantee either a job 
offer, continuous training, or an internship within four 
months after a young person has completed formal educa-
tion or become unemployed. 
There is broad agreement that apprenticeship and 
training contracts are, in theory, successful ways to help 
young people acquire skills and work experience at the 
same time. In this sense, although young people with a 
vocational training face different problems joining the 
labor market than their more academically oriented coun-
terparts, both experience a common disconnect between 
education and work.
With regard to vocational training, Spain is trying to 
implement the so-called dual system along German and 
Swiss lines. It is well known, however, that the key to 
apprentices’ success in firms is that they develop outside 
traditional schools, receiving a combination of instruction 
and work experience. This is precisely where the Spanish 
economy faces greater challenges. The average firm size 
in Spain is extremely small, and small firms account for a 
large share of the country’s total employment. Such small 
firms have very low training capacity. The structural con-
straints of the Spanish economy therefore make it truly 
difficult for such training programs to be successful.
It is also crucial to link training to the work experience 
of university graduates. A widespread practice in Spain 
is to hire recent college graduates with a kind of “ap-
prenticeship” or “scholarship” contracts. (Known as becas, 
these are sometimes closer to the idea of a grant.) In 
most cases, however, becas are far from genuine training 
contracts. Very often they have no training component 
whatsoever. Many employers see them as a cheap way to 
hire workers for less-demanding tasks. They seldom turn 
into real jobs; a new “apprentice” simply fills the vacancy. 
To enhance the potential stepping-stone effect of such ap-
prenticeship contracts, it has been suggested that employ-
ers should have a financial incentive to hire their former 
apprentices on a more permanent basis at the end of their 
becas.18
Develop Active Labor Market Policies
Reviews of the effectiveness of active labor market poli-
cies have shown that job-search monitoring and quality 
assistance programs tend to be cost-effective and have a 
considerable impact on employment, in particular in the 
short run and long term.19 On-the-job training programs 
also have good outcomes but more in the medium run 
than in the short run. In contrast, direct job creation by 
the public sector has proven to have the lowest impact on 
employment.
Though shown to have limited efficiency, employment 
subsidies have in fact increased in recent years in Spain. 
These cover not only employment incentives to employ-
ers but also subsidies to unemployed people who are 
starting their own enterprises (fig. 6). Compared to other 
countries, both measures comprise a considerable part of 
Spain’s public expenditure on active labor market policies. 
Sometimes, however, it is not a matter of spending more 
but rather a matter of spending better. Two priority prob-
lems regarding the active labor market are therefore 1) 
how to avoid excessive recourse to employment subsidies 
and 2) how to improve the functioning of public employ-
ment services. 
One of the most significant measures implemented in 
Spain in recent years has been the subsidization of perma-
nent contract hires. This does not appear to have been 
truly successful, however, and the conversion rate of tem-
Figure 6. Public Expenditure of Active Labor Market  
Policies as Percentage of GDP
Source: OECD Statistics
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porary to permanent jobs remains low. The 2012 reform of 
the work and training contract, which increased the age 
of eligibility from 25 to 29 and relaxed its conditions, was 
supposed to boost this kind of contract (the main instru-
ment for fighting youth unemployment over the last thirty 
years, but in decline since the 1990s). However, conver-
sion rates from internships to indefinite contracts remain 
minimal.20 Another problem associated with subsidies of 
this kind are their deadweight and substitution effects. As 
has been extensively shown, the expected employment 
gains are indeed very small in the short term when aggre-
gate demand and vacancies are fixed.21
Spain’s public employment services (PES) are poorly 
adapted to the real needs of the labor market; they are 
only involved in a very low proportion of contracts signed 
and are not really aimed at activating employment or 
finding personalized ways to help people get back to work. 
In fact, the unemployed widely consider the PES as a 
means of managing unemployment benefits. In this sense, 
the great challenges for the Spanish PES is modernization 
and making it possible for unemployed youth to turn to 
their offices even when they are not entitled to unemploy-
ment benefits. 
Reduce Labor Market Segmentation
The Youth Guarantee recommendation adopted by the 
EU’s Council of Ministers in April 2013 seeks to ensure 
that all EU member states “make a good-quality offer of 
employment, continued education, an apprenticeship or 
a traineeship” to all young people under 25 “within four 
months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal edu-
cation.”22 In its theoretical and inspirational guidelines, 
which recommend combining early intervention with 
activation policies, the Youth Guarantee strategy seems to 
be a good idea for improving the link between education 
and the labor market and including elements of activation 
in Spain’s employment policies. 
Several experts have already pointed out, however, 
that the expected gains from its introduction are very 
small in the absence of an agenda to stimulate growth 
in Europe. Specifically, there is a risk that introducing 
the Youth Guarantee may defer the implementation of 
more politically challenging reforms, such as measures 
to reduce labor market dualism.23 In this regard, it is 
important to keep in mind that Spain, because of its high 
employment protection legislation gap, is the paradigmat-
ic example of a dual labor market characterized by a high 
degree of labor market segmentation between temporary 
and permanent jobs. Other structural problems in the 
labor market invite adopting deeper measures aimed at 
reducing the gap between outsiders and insiders.
So far, one proposal has been to reduce the gap in 
severance payments between temporary and permanent 
contracts, as was done in the 2012 reform. Another idea 
gaining increasing attention as a more effective way to 
decrease the duality in Spain is the elimination of tem-
porary contracts, replacing these with a new permanent 
contract that specifies severance payments increasing 
progressively on the basis of seniority.24 In the same vein, 
another proposal is the combination of a such a contract 
with the “Austrian capitalization fund” – a workers’ 
notional account involving a few percentage points of 
payroll taxes, which can be used along the life cycle and 
not necessarily when a dismissal takes place.25
All in all, the political economy equilibrium of this 
deeper reform is difficult to achieve in the short term 
given the current balance of forces in Spanish parliament. 
In the meantime, an easier measure that would gather 
more agreement in the short term would therefore be to 
increase the length of the probationary period in perma-
nent contracts. In Spain the trial period in permanent 
contracts is among the lowest compared to neighbor-
ing countries.26 Raising it would make employers less 
reluctant to hire inexperienced youth under permanent 
contracts.
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